Understanding the structure of a problem, such as the relationships between stimuli, supports fast learning and flexible reasoning. Rodent work has suggested that the abstraction of structure away from sensory details occurs over the course of multiple days in the cortex. However, direct evidence of such explicit relational representations in humans is scarce, and it is unclear whether they emerge on similar timescales. Here, we combine a graph-learning paradigm with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to look for such a relational map in the human brain. We first trained participants on two associative graphs with the same structure. We then scanned participants twice while they used this knowledge, with several days between scanning sessions. Using fMRI repetition suppression, we found an abstract relational representation in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) that emerged across the two scanning sessions. This finding was also replicated using representational similarity analysis (RSA). These results shed new light on how neural representations organizing relational knowledge change with time.

In dynamic environments, relying only on simple stimulus–response associations is often insufficient, because identical experiences rarely recur. Instead, we need internal models that allow us to flexibly generalize past knowledge and plan for future events. The hippocampus plays a crucial role in this process by constructing cognitive maps that guide adaptive, goal-directed behavior. However, in complex and constantly changing real-world situations, no single map can capture all relevant information. The brain must therefore maintain multiple cognitive maps, each linked to its own latent context. Because there is often uncertainty about the hidden context underlying our observations, the brain must continuously decide which map to rely on to guide behavior, and to what extent that map should be updated or replaced. Here, we review the roles of the hippocampus and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) in providing cognitive maps and signalling inferred contexts, and how prediction errors and neuromodulators drive the ongoing arbitration between them. Disruptions in these processes—such as altered map formation, distorted map content, or impaired map arbitration—may promote overgeneralization of fear and contribute to avoidance behaviors commonly observed in anxiety.

Social anxiety disorder is a common mental health condition characterized by an intense fear of social situations that can lead to significant impairment in daily life. Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) has been recognized as an effective treatment; however, access to therapists is limited, and the fear of interacting with therapists can delay treatment seeking. Furthermore, not all individuals respond. Tailoring modular treatments to individual cognitive profiles may improve efficacy. We developed a novel digital adaptation of CBT for social anxiety that is both modular and fully digital without a therapist in the loop and implemented it in the smartphone app Alena

The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) has long been associated with economic and social decision-making in neuroimaging studies. Several debates question whether different ventral mPFC (vmPFC) and dorsal mPFC (dmPFC) regions have specific functions or whether there is a gradient supporting social and nonsocial cognition. Here, we tested an unusually large sample of rare participants with focal damage to the mPFC (N = 33), individuals with lesions elsewhere (N = 17), and healthy controls (N = 71) (total N = 121). Participants completed a temporal discounting task to estimate their baseline discounting preferences before learning the preferences of two other people, one who was more temporally impulsive and one more patient. We used Bayesian computational models to estimate baseline discounting and susceptibility to social influence after learning others’ economic preferences. mPFC damage increased susceptibility to impulsive social influence compared to healthy controls and increased overall susceptibility to social influence compared to those with lesions elsewhere. Importantly, voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping (VLSM) of computational parameters showed that this heightened susceptibility to social influence was attributed specifically to damage to the dmPFC (area 9; permutation-based threshold-free cluster enhancement (TFCE) p < 0.025). In contrast, lesions in the vmPFC (areas 13 and 25) and ventral striatum were associated with a preference for seeking more immediate rewards (permutation-based TFCE p < 0.05). We show that the dmPFC is causally implicated in susceptibility to social influence, with distinct ventral portions of mPFC involved in temporal discounting. These findings provide causal evidence for sub-regions of the mPFC underpinning fundamental social and cognitive processes.

Adaptive behavior in complex environments critically relies on the ability to appropriately link specific choices or actions to their outcomes. However, the neural mechanisms that support the ability to credit only those past choices believed to have caused the observed outcomes remain unclear. Here, we leverage multivariate pattern analyses of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data and an adaptive learning task to shed light on the underlying neural mechanisms of such specific credit assignment. We find that the lateral orbitofrontal cortex (lOFC) and hippocampus (HC) code for the causal choice identity when credit needs to be assigned for choices that are separated from outcomes by a long delay, even when this delayed transition is punctuated by interim decisions. Further, we show when interim decisions must be made, learning is additionally supported by lateral frontopolar cortex (lFPC). Our results indicate that lFPC holds previous causal choices in a ‘pending’ state until a relevant outcome is observed, and the fidelity of these representations predicts the fidelity of subsequent causal choice representations in lOFC and HC during credit assignment. Together, these results highlight the importance of the timely reinstatement of specific causes in lOFC and HC in learning choice-outcome relationships when delays and choices intervene, a critical component of real-world learning and decision making.

The ability to generalize previously learned knowledge to novel situations is crucial for adaptive behavior, representing a form of cognitive flexibility that is particularly relevant in language. Humans excel at combining linguistic building blocks to infer the meanings of novel compositional words, such as “un-reject-able-ish”. How do we accomplish this? While recent research on compositional generalization in relational memory, action planning and vision strongly implicates a medial prefrontal-hippocampal network (Baram et al., 2021; Barron et al., 2020; Schwartenbeck et al., 2023), it remains unclear whether the same network supports compositional inference in language. To this end, we trained participants on an artificial language in which the meanings of compositional words could be derived from known stems and unknown affixes, using abstract affixation rules (e.g., “good-kla” which means “bad”, where “-kla” reverses the meaning of the stem word “good”). According to these rules, word meaning depended on the sequential relation between the stem and the affix (i.e., pre- vs. post-stem). During fMRI, participants performed a semantic priming task, with novel compositional words as either sequential order congruent (e.g., “white-kla”) or incongruent primes (e.g., “kla-white”), and synonyms of the composed meaning as targets (“black”). Our results show that the compositional process engages a broad temporoparietal network, including the hippocampus, while the composed meanings are represented in left-lateralized language areas. Notably, newly composed meanings were decodable already at the time of the prime. Finally, we found that the composition process recruits abstract structure rule representations in a lateral frontoparietal network, rather than the predicted medial frontotemporal network, perhaps because abstract rules in language are more readily formatted as production rules rather than as relational map structures.

The hippocampal-entorhinal system uses cognitive maps to represent spatial knowledge and other types of relational information. However, objects can often be characterized by different types of relations simultaneously. How does the hippocampal formation handle the embedding of stimuli in multiple relational structures that differ vastly in their mode and timescale of acquisition? Does the hippocampal formation integrate different stimulus dimensions into one conjunctive map or is each dimension represented in a parallel map? Here, we reanalyzed human functional magnetic resonance imaging data from Garvert et al. (2017) that had previously revealed a map in the hippocampal formation coding for a newly learnt transition structure. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging adaptation analysis, we found that the degree of representational similarity in the bilateral hippocampus also decreased as a function of the semantic distance between presented objects. Importantly, while both map-like structures localized to the hippocampal formation, the semantic map was located in more posterior regions of the hippocampal formation than the transition structure and thus anatomically distinct. This finding supports the idea that the hippocampal-entorhinal system forms parallel cognitive maps that reflect the embedding of objects in diverse relational structures.

How valuable a choice option is often changes over time, making the prediction of value changes an important challenge for decision making. Prior studies identified a cognitive map in the hippocampal-entorhinal system that encodes relationships between states and enables prediction of future states, but does not inherently convey value during prospective decision making. In this fMRI study, participants predicted changing values of choice options in a sequence, forming a trajectory through an abstract two-dimensional value space. During this task, the entorhinal cortex exhibited a grid-like representation with an orientation aligned to the axis through the value space most informative for choices. A network of brain regions, including ventromedial prefrontal cortex, tracked the prospective value difference between options. These findings suggest that the entorhinal grid system supports the prediction of future values by representing a cognitive map, which might be used to generate lower-dimensional value signals to guide prospective decision making.

People differ in their levels of impulsivity and patience, and these preferences are heavily influenced by others. Previous research suggests that susceptibility to social influence may vary with age, but the mechanisms and whether people are more influenced by patience or impulsivity remain unknown. Here, using a delegated inter-temporal choice task and Bayesian computational models, we tested susceptibility to social influence in young (aged 18–36, N = 76) and older (aged 60–80, N = 78) adults. Participants completed a temporal discounting task and then learnt the preferences of two other people (one more impulsive and one more patient) before making their choices again. We used the signed Kullback-Leibler divergence to quantify the magnitude and direction of social influence. We found that, compared to young adults, older adults were relatively more susceptible to impulsive social influence. Factor analyses showed that older adults with higher self-reported levels of affective empathy and emotional motivation were particularly susceptible to impulsive influence. Importantly, older and young adults showed similar learning accuracy about others’ preferences, and their baseline impulsivity did not differ. Together, these findings suggest highly affectively empathetic and emotionally motivated older adults may be at higher risk for impulsive decisions, due to their susceptibility to social influence.

Humans represent scenes and objects in rich feature spaces, carrying information that allows us to generalise about category memberships and abstract functions with few examples. What determines whether a neural network model generalises like a human? We tested how well the representations of $86$ pretrained neural network models mapped to human learning trajectories across two tasks where humans had to learn continuous relationships and categories of natural images. In these tasks, both human participants and neural networks successfully identified the relevant stimulus features within a few trials, demonstrating effective generalisation. We found that while training dataset size was a core determinant of alignment with human choices, contrastive training with multi-modal data (text and imagery) was a common feature of currently publicly available models that predicted human generalisation. Intrinsic dimensionality of representations had different effects on alignment for different model types. Lastly, we tested three sets of human-aligned representations and found no consistent improvements in predictive accuracy compared to the baselines. In conclusion, pretrained neural networks can serve to extract representations for cognitive models, as they appear to capture some fundamental aspects of cognition that are transferable across tasks. Both our paradigms and modelling approach offer a novel way to quantify alignment between neural networks and humans and extend cognitive science into more naturalistic domains.

Episodic and spatial memory are the two key components of the mnemonic system in humans. Episodic memory enables us to remember events from the past whereas spatial memory enables us to form a map-like representation of the environment. Interestingly, these seemingly different functions rely on the same brain structure: the hippocampus. Yet, how the hippocampus supports both at the same time remains unclear. Here, we tested the hypotheses that the hippocampus supports these two systems either via a common coding mechanism or via a parallel processing mechanism. To this end, we combined functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with an episodic life-simulation task and a spatial virtual reality task to manipulate episodic and spatial context associations of objects. We then investigated fMRI adaptation effects between these objects as a result of shared contexts. We found that the fMRI signal in the anterior hippocampus scaled with the combined prediction of shared episodic and spatial contexts, in line with the idea of a common coding mechanism. We found no evidence for a parallel processing mechanism, as there were no differences between episodic and spatial effects. The common coding effect for episodic and spatial memory dovetails with the broader notion of domain-general hippocampal cognitive maps.

The brain forms cognitive maps of relational knowledge—an organizing principle thought to underlie our ability to generalize and make inferences. However, how can a relevant map be selected in situations where a stimulus is embedded in multiple relational structures? Here, we find that both spatial and predictive cognitive maps influence generalization in a choice task, where spatial location determines reward magnitude. Mirroring behavior, the hippocampus not only builds a map of spatial relationships but also encodes the experienced transition structure. As the task progresses, participants’ choices become more influenced by spatial relationships, reflected in a strengthening of the spatial map and a weakening of the predictive map. This change is driven by orbitofrontal cortex, which represents the degree to which an outcome is consistent with the spatial rather than the predictive map and updates hippocampal representations accordingly. Taken together, this demonstrates how hippocampal cognitive maps are used and updated flexibly for inference.

The ventromedial prefrontal-cortex (vmPFC) is known to contain expected value signals that inform our choices. But expected values even for the same stimulus can differ by task. In this study, we asked how the brain flexibly switches between such value representations in a task-dependent manner. Thirty-five participants alternated between tasks in which either stimulus color or motion predicted rewards. We show that multivariate vmPFC signals contain a rich representation that includes the current task state or context (motion/color), the associated expected value, and crucially, the irrelevant value of the alternative context. We also find that irrelevant value representations in vmPFC compete with relevant value signals, interact with task-state representations and relate to behavioral signs of value competition. Our results shed light on vmPFC’s role in decision making, bridging between its role in mapping observations onto the task states of a mental map, and computing expected values for multiple states.

How do humans generalise to make better decisions? Previous work has investigated this question using reward-guided decision-making tasks with low-dimensional and artificial stimuli. In this paper, we extend this work by presenting participants with a naturalistic decision-making task, in which options were images of real-world objects and the underlying reward function was based on one of their latent dimensions. Even though participants received no explicit instruction about object features, they quickly learned to do the task and generalised to unseen objects. To understand how they accomplished this, we tested a range of computational models and found that human behaviour is overall best explained by a linear model but that participants' strategies changed during the experiment. Lastly, we showed that combining pixel-based representations extracted from convolutional neural networks with the original latent dimensions further improved our models. Taken together, our study offers new insights into human decision making under naturalistic settings.

Neuroeconomics paradigms have demonstrated that learning about another’s beliefs can make you more like them (i.e., contagion). Due to social deficits in autism, it is possible that autistic individuals will be immune to contagion. We fit Bayesian computational models to a temporal discounting task, where participants made decisions for themselves before and after learning the distinct preferences of two others. Two independent neurotypical samples (N = 48; N = 98) both showed a significant contagion effect; however the strength of contagion was unrelated to autistic traits. Equivalence tests showed autistic (N = 12) and matched neurotypical N = 12) samples had similar levels of contagion and accuracy when learning about others. Despite social impairments being at the core of autistic symptomatology, contagion of value preferences appears to be intact.

Knowledge of the structure of a problem, such as relationships between stimuli, enables rapid learning and flexible inference. Humans and other animals can abstract this structural knowledge and generalize it to solve new problems. For example, in spatial reasoning, shortest-path inferences are immediate in new environments. Spatial structural transfer is mediated by cells in entorhinal and (in humans) medial prefrontal cortices, which maintain their co-activation structure across different environments and behavioral states. Here, using fMRI, we show that entorhinal and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) representations perform a much broader role in generalizing the structure of problems. We introduce a task-remapping paradigm, where subjects solve multiple reinforcement learning (RL) problems differing in structural or sensory properties. We show that, as with space, entorhinal representations are preserved across different RL problems only if task structure is preserved. In vmPFC and ventral striatum, representations of prediction error also depend on task structure.

Learning and generalization in spatial domains is often thought to rely on a “cognitive map”, representing relationships between spatial locations. Recent research suggests that this same neural machinery is also recruited for reasoning about more abstract, conceptual forms of knowledge. Yet, to what extent do spatial and conceptual reasoning share common computational principles, and what are the implications for behavior? Using a within-subject design we studied how participants used spatial or conceptual distances to generalize and search for correlated rewards in successive multi-armed bandit tasks. Participant behavior indicated sensitivity to both spatial and conceptual distance, and was best captured using a Bayesian model of generalization that formalized distance-dependent generalization and uncertainty-guided exploration as a Gaussian Process regression with a radial basis function kernel. The same Gaussian Process model best captured human search decisions and judgments in both domains, and could simulate realistic learning curves, where we found equivalent levels of generalization in spatial and conceptual tasks. At the same time, we also find characteristic differences between domains. Relative to the spatial domain, participants showed reduced levels of uncertainty-directed exploration and increased levels of random exploration in the conceptual domain. Participants also displayed a one-directional transfer effect, where experience in the spatial task boosted performance in the conceptual task, but not vice versa. While confidence judgments indicated that participants were sensitive to the uncertainty of their knowledge in both tasks, they did not or could not leverage their estimates of uncertainty to guide exploration in the conceptual task. These results support the notion that value-guided learning and generalization recruit cognitive-map dependent computational mechanisms in spatial and conceptual domains. Yet both behavioral and model-based analyses suggest domain specific differences in how these representations map onto actions.

The hippocampal–entorhinal system encodes a map of space that guides spatial navigation. Goal-directed behaviour outside of spatial navigation similarly requires a representation of abstract forms of relational knowledge. This information relies on the same neural system, but it is not known whether the organisational principles governing continuous maps may extend to the implicit encoding of discrete, non-spatial graphs. Here, we show that the human hippocampal–entorhinal system can represent relationships between objects using a metric that depends on associative strength. We reconstruct a map-like knowledge structure directly from a hippocampal–entorhinal functional magnetic resonance imaging adaptation signal in a situation where relationships are non-spatial rather than spatial, discrete rather than continuous, and unavailable to conscious awareness. Notably, the measure that best predicted a behavioural signature of implicit knowledge and blood oxygen level-dependent adaptation was a weighted sum of future states, akin to the successor representation that has been proposed to account for place and grid-cell firing patterns.

Understanding how the human brain gives rise to complex cognitive processes remains one of the biggest challenges of contemporary neuroscience. While invasive recording in animal models can provide insight into neural processes that are conserved across species, our understanding of cognition more broadly relies upon investigation of the human brain itself. There is therefore an imperative to establish non-invasive tools that allow human brain activity to be measured at high spatial and temporal resolution. In recent years, various attempts have been made to refine the coarse signal available in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), providing a means to investigate neural activity at the meso-scale, i.e. at the level of neural populations. The most widely used techniques include repetition suppression and multivariate pattern analysis. Human neuroscience can now use these techniques to investigate how representations are encoded across neural populations and transformed by relevant computations. Here, we review the physiological basis, applications and limitations of fMRI repetition suppression with a brief comparison to multivariate techniques. By doing so, we show how fMRI repetition suppression holds promise as a tool to reveal complex neural mechanisms that underlie human cognitive function.

Learning induces plasticity in neuronal networks. As neuronal populations contribute to multiple representations, we reasoned plasticity in one representation might influence others. We used human fMRI repetition suppression to show that plasticity induced by learning another individual’s values impacts upon a value representation for oneself in medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), a plasticity also evident behaviorally in a preference shift. We show this plasticity is driven by a striatal “prediction error,” signaling the discrepancy between the other’s choice and a subject’s own preferences. Thus, our data highlight that mPFC encodes agent-independent representations of subjective value, such that prediction errors simultaneously update multiple agents’ value representations. As the resulting change in representational similarity predicts interindividual differences in the malleability of subjective preferences, our findings shed mechanistic light on complex human processes such as the powerful influence of social interaction on beliefs and preferences.

The confidence that we place in our decisions can affect the judgments themselves. The BOLD signal in ventromedial prefrontal cortex automatically reflects the relationship between confidence and judgments on a range of tasks.

The brain requires ∼20% of the body's total energy. When the body is deprived of energy, such as during hypoxia and in pathologies involving an altered energy metabolism, the brain's function can be severely and irreversibly disrupted. However, humans routinely cope with transient hypoxia, for example when diving under water. How do our brains resist this temporary disruption in energy supply, and is it possible to harness these mechanisms for therapeutic use?

Human faces may signal relevant information and are therefore analysed rapidly and effectively by the brain. However, the precise mechanisms and pathways involved in rapid face processing are unclear. One view posits a role for a subcortical connection between early visual sensory regions and the amygdala, while an alternative account emphasises cortical mediation. To adjudicate between these functional architectures, we recorded magnetoencephalographic (MEG) evoked fields in human subjects to presentation of faces with varying emotional valence. Early brain activity was better explained by dynamic causal models containing a direct subcortical connection to the amygdala irrespective of emotional modulation. At longer latencies, models without a subcortical connection had comparable evidence. Hence, our results support the hypothesis that a subcortical pathway to the amygdala plays a role in rapid sensory processing of faces, in particular during early stimulus processing. This finding contributes to an understanding of the amygdala as a behavioural relevance detector.

Retinal ganglion cells react to changes in visual contrast by adjusting their sensitivity and temporal filtering characteristics. This contrast adaptation has primarily been studied under spatially homogeneous stimulation. Yet, ganglion cell receptive fields are often characterized by spatial subfields, providing a substrate for nonlinear spatial processing. This raises the question whether contrast adaptation follows a similar subfield structure or whether it occurs globally over the receptive field even for local stimulation. We therefore recorded ganglion cell activity in isolated salamander retinas while locally changing visual contrast. Ganglion cells showed primarily global adaptation characteristics, with notable exceptions in certain aspects of temporal filtering. Surprisingly, some changes in filtering were most pronounced for locations where contrast did not change. This seemingly paradoxical effect can be explained by a simple computational model, which emphasizes the importance of local nonlinearities in the retina and suggests a reevaluation of previously reported local contrast adaptation.